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ing market experienced a convulsion
more extreme than in any previous re-
corded cycle. From May 2001 to May
2006, the Case/Shiller Standard & Poor’s
twenty-city housing price index, which
controls for changes in housing quality
by comparing prices from repeat sales of
the same homes, rose 54 percent more
than consumer prices rose. In the three
years that followed, housing prices, mea-
sured by the same index and corrected
for inflation, fell more than one-third.
Across metropolitan areas, the corre-
lation between boom and bust was al-
most perfect. For every 10 percent that
an area’s prices increased between 2001
and 2006, that area’s prices fell by 7.6
percent between 2006 and 2009. As
prices plummeted, ½nancial institu-
tions that had exposed themselves to 
sizable housing-market risk became
insolvent. The entire U.S. banking
system seemed at risk. 
The extreme housing-price swings
were mirrored by equally oversized fluc-
tuations in the construction industry.
America typically produces about 1.5
million housing units annually, which
is about 200,000 more than the rate of
household formation. In both 2005 and
2006, builders completed more than 1.9
million new units, at least 580,000 more
than the rate of household formation in
each year. By a conservative estimate,
America erected at least 2 million extra
units, relative to historic standards, dur-
ing the boom. By 2009, there were up-
wards of 5 million more vacant homes 
in the United States than there were in
2000. That glut, in turn, explains the de-
cline in new construction and jobs: few-
er than 800,000 units were built in 2009;
the unemployment rate in the construc-
tion sector exceeded 20 percent in early
2010. 
While the extremity of the cycle is
clear, the causes of the great housing
convulsion are more mysterious. Some
economists have emphasized the role 
of easy credit and low interest rates. 
Certainly, as real and nominal rates fell,
buyers bene½ted from cheaper mort-
gages, and credit-constrained purchas-
ers were able to cover the costs of more
expensive houses. But there is little evi-
dence to support the view that changes 
in interest rates were large enough to ex-
plain the housing market’s recent crash.
On average, as interest rates decline by
one percentage point, housing prices
increase by roughly 6.8 percent. Even at
very low interest rate levels in markets
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hundred-basis-point decrease in real
rates does not push prices up more than 
8 percent. Between 2000 and 2006, real
interest rates fell by 1.3 percent, which
suggests that falling rates can explain, at
most, a 10.4 percent housing price rise. 
Another view implicates aggressive
mortgage approval or low loan-to-value
ratios. Similarly, compelling evidence to
support this explanation is hard to ½nd.
My work with economist Joshua Gott-
lieb and ½nance expert Joseph Gyourko1
has estimated that changes in approv-
al rates explain about one-½fth to one-
third of the price boom. Loan-to-value
levels appear to have an even smaller
impact, but the dif½culty of controlling
for changes in the pool of mortgage ap-
plications limits the value of this ½nd-
ing. Moreover, the results of our research
are not meant to clear the Federal Re-
serve System, or anyone else, of error,
but rather to emphasize that we cannot
identify with any certainty what caused
the boom or why it ended. 
We do know, however, that individ-
ual buyers had wildly unrealistic ex-
pectations about future price growth 
and little understanding of the basic
economics of housing markets. Typical-
ly, housing prices adjust back to their
historic norms, so that if prices rise, 
relative to historic trends, by an addi-
tional $10,000 over one ½ve-year peri-
od, those prices should be expected to
fall (again, relative to trend) by $3,200
over the next ½ve-year period.2Yet dur-
ing booms, economists Karl Case and
Robert Shiller have found, buyers typi-
cally expect growth to continue.3Such
irrational exuberance was clearly pres-
ent in Las Vegas in 2006, when home
buyers paid more than twice as much 
as buyers had only six years earlier. 
The price booms in Las Vegas and
Phoenix are particularly hard to recon-
cile with informed housing acquisition.
These areas have few limits on new con-
struction, and builders supply new hous-
ing for less than $100 per square foot.
The power of unfettered building has
long kept prices low despite decades of
enormous growth. But while these mar-
kets did not see price growth during the
boom of the late 1980s, buyers in Phoe-
nix and Las Vegas must have assumed
that their regions were headed for a per-
manently higher price plateau. Subse-
quent events have proven that, to the
contrary, unrestricted construction will,
in the medium run, keep prices low.
While we do not yet understand the
reason for the whirlwind that coursed
through the housing markets, we can
draw a major policy lesson from the cy-
cle. For decades, the U.S. government
has pushed homeownership with poli-
cies that subsidize mortgage rates and
encourage borrowing. The bust reminds
us that housing prices move down as
well as up. Promoting homeownership
by subsidizing borrowing now seems 
as likely to create a “default nation” as 
it does an “ownership nation.” Federal
policies that encouraged home buyers 
to leverage themselves to the hilt in or-
der to bet on housing were clearly com-
plicit in the debacle. As the crash has
demonstrated, it is time to rethink
these policies. 
T he home mortgage interest deduc-
tion, the sacred cow of federal housing
guidelines, was not originally meant to
serve as a housing policy. It was intro-
duced with the income tax law in 1916,
when essentially all interest payments
were deductible. Home mortgages were 
a minor form of borrowing at that time;
the deductibility of interest was largely
used to make business expenses tax de-
ductible. Although the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 eliminated the deductibility of
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then the majority of Americans were
homeowners, and the home mortgage
interest deduction had become untouch-
able. Today, the deduction is restricted
to mortgages of less than $1 million, or
to the ½rst $1 million of mortgages above
that amount, though in 2005, President
Bush’s tax reform panel unsuccessfully
proposed a substantial reduction of that
upper limit. 
In the wake of the Great Depression–
era housing crisis, the federal government
pursued a number of interventions to re-
invigorate the moribund credit market.
The National Housing Act created the
Federal Housing Administration (fha)
in 1934; it encouraged home buying by
insuring mortgages against default. The
fha has typically charged borrowers a
signi½cant “up-front” mortgage insur-
ance charge (equal to 2.25 percent of the
mortgage during mid-2010)4and has ½-
nanced itself from that fee.5In fact, dur-
ing the early postwar period, the organi-
zation received criticism from the left
for being too stingy and refusing insur-
ance to borrowers and neighborhoods
that the fha deemed higher risk. Dur-
ing the same period, the Veterans’ Ad-
ministration (va) also became a signi½-
cant insurer of new mortgages at below-
market rates; recent evidence uncovered
by economist Dan Fetter suggests that
the va had a signi½cant impact on home-
ownership. The fhawas relatively in-
active during the recent boom, as pri-
vate insurers offered better terms; in
2009, however, one-third of all new
mortgages were fha-insured. 
In 1938, the fha was joined by the
Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae), which was also intend-
ed to encourage bank lending. While 
the fhainsured mortgages, Fannie Mae
actually bought mortgages from banks,
freeing capital and allowing banks to
make more loans. When Fannie was pri-
vatized in the 1960s, the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie
Mac) was created to generate competi-
tion. During the 1970s, Freddie and Fan-
nie moved–with private-sector partners
like Salomon Brothers–into the securiti-
zation business. They moved from hold-
ing mortgages on their own balance
sheets to becoming pass-through agen-
cies that bundled and insured mortgages
for resale on the secondary market. Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac used a varie-
ty of criteria, such as debt-to-income
ratios, credit rating, and mortgage size,
to determine whether a particular loan
conformed to quality standards and
could be securitized. Like the fha, Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac primarily im-
pacted housing markets by allowing bet-
ter credit terms. A third player, the Gov-
ernment National Mortgage Association
(Ginnie Mae), also insures mortgage-
backed securities and does so with the
full faith and credit of the U.S. govern-
ment. Ginnie Mae’s role is considerably
more modest, however, because it in-
sures securities representing mortgages
that already have a guarantee from the
fha, va, or another federal source. 
During most of their post-privatiza-
tion history, these enterprises steadfast-
ly claimed that their pro½ts reflected the
bene½ts that came from the large, liquid
market in mortgage-backed securities
created by the vast scale of their opera-
tions, not implicit government guaran-
tees. Those claims were never terribly
plausible, and they certainly are not so
today, as the agencies are now kept alive
only through tax dollars. Although these
entities continue to be subsidized primar-
ily because their failure would further
damage the economy, historically, Fan-
nie Mae was justi½ed as a means of solv-
ing market imperfections in the second-
ary mortgage market. Because banks
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mortgages on their books and sell only
the worst mortgages on any secondary
market, the fact that Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac guaranteed mortgages was
supposed to prevent a market breakdown.
Today, however, a large market in private
mortgage insurance permits securities
backed by jumbo mortgages, credit card
debt, and commercial credit to trade
comfortably in the secondary market
without an implicit federal guarantee. 
The majority of federal housing poli-
cies are either less signi½cant or less prob-
lematic. Section 8 housing vouchers pro-
vide housing-related aid to poorer Amer-
icans, who typically rent. Economists
generally accept this intervention as a
reasonable form of market-oriented in-
kind redistribution. The Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit subsidizes the pro-
duction of affordable housing nation-
wide. The credit, however sensible in
places where housing is expensive, such
as along America’s coasts, is less tenable
in the case of construction-crazy Atlanta
or depressed Detroit. I am no fan of the
tax credit, but I will restrict my discus-
sion to the even bigger interventions–
the home mortgage interest deduction,
the fha, and the Government-Spon-
sored Enterprises (gses)–that encour-
age people to buy homes by borrowing
cheaply. 
In 2009 and 2010, the Federal Reserve
bought $1.25 trillion worth of mortgage-
backed securities, allegedly “to provide
support to mortgage and housing mar-
kets and to foster improved conditions
in ½nancial markets more generally.”6
The vast size of this purchase certainly
suggests the large public cost of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, but the interven-
tion itself had far more to do with avoid-
ing a ½nancial market meltdown than
with supporting housing markets. This
essay focuses on the housing policies
that helped create the crisis, not on the
interventions–like the purchase of mort-
gage-backed securities–that tried to pre-
vent the Great Recession from turning
into a second Great Depression.
Broadly speaking, there are three pub-
lic objectives that underlie housing in-
terventions and, in theory, justify the
existence of the fha, Fannie Mae, and
Freddie Mac. The ½rst is narrowly relat-
ed to imperfect information in credit
markets. For at least four decades, econ-
omists have understood that a “lemons”
problem–whereby borrower and lend-
er have asymmetric information–may
hamper insurance or lending markets. 
In principle, the lending market could
break down if some borrowers face a
higher cost (psychic or otherwise) of
default than others and if those borrow-
ers (but not their lenders) know the costs
of default. If lenders cannot distinguish
between high and low risk and, in turn,
charge all borrowers the same rate, then
it is possible that high-risk borrowers
will be more likely to borrow while low-
risk borrowers may choose to self-½nance
or, less plausibly, rent. In this scenario,
the high-risk borrowers are willing to
pay the high interest because they have 
a greater chance of defaulting, or exer-
cising their option not to repay the loan.
If only risky borrowers go to banks, then
interest rates will be extremely high, in
which case the safe borrowers who will
never default may prefer to avoid the mar-
ket altogether. A vicious circle results in
which risky borrowers cause high inter-
est rates, and high interest rates deter
safe borrowers. The fhais tasked with
preventing this scenario by creating a
more liquid market that does not charge
prohibitively high rates.
A similar breakdown can occur in the
secondary market for mortgages if mort-
gage issuers know more about a mort-
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er. The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission case ½led against invest-
ment banking and securities ½rm Gold-
man Sachs in April 2010 hinges squarely
on whether the ½rm had material private
information about mortgage-backed
securities that it failed to disclose. More
generally, mortgage issuers, like banks,
have an incentive to keep the good mort-
gages on their own balance sheets and
sell only the bad mortgages to outside
investors. This lemons problem in the
secondary market can impede the devel-
opment of a risk-sharing mortgage mar-
ket and lead banks to hold housing risk
in their own portfolios. If bank defaults
carry systemic consequences, either be-
cause of federal deposit insurance or
because a failure of the banking system
threatens the entire economy, then the
country has an interest in developing a
secondary market to spread mortgage
risk more widely. By creating a subsidy
so that all mortgages, at least within a
given class, are resold, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac can help that lemons prob-
lem disappear. 
These asymmetric information prob-
lems are real, but are they large enough
to justify the vast public subsidies that
now exist? Do the public subsidies actu-
ally solve the problems? A remarkably
large body of information about borrow-
ers and their credit histories is available
to banks and could be provided to pur-
chasers of mortgage-backed securities.
The fact that many lenders were sloppy
in the run-up to the crash and ignored
this information does not help the case
for public insurance, which only mutes
the incentives for due diligence. More-
over, an abundance of lending occurs
without the bene½t of public insurance.
Many mortgages are securitized without
the help of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Arguably, the fhaand Fannie Mae made
sense during the Great Depression but
are less relevant today. It is particularly
hard to justify the existence of for-pro½t
entities that deal in mortgages with the
aid of an implicit government guarantee. 
A second reason for public interven-
tion in the mortgage markets is the de-
sire to encourage Americans, especially
veterans, to consume more housing. In
1940, 45 percent of America’s housing
units lacked complete plumbing facili-
ties, and 20 percent housed more than
one person per room.7Nostalgia for pre-
war housing is misguided: the attractive
older homes that remain are the homes
that were nice enough to keep around.
The typical prewar home was terrible
by modern standards. 
Prewar America provided at least 
three defensible reasons for the govern-
ment to encourage housing consump-
tion. First, tiny homes that lacked plumb-
ing were often unsanitary and helped
spread disease. The externalities from
contagious illness were a primary moti-
vation for the progressive reformers who
focused on improving housing condi-
tions in America’s cities. Second, Ameri-
cans have often been more comfortable
with in-kind transfers, like food stamps,
then with outright cash grants. It was
surely an easier political sell to support
better housing than to support higher
welfare payments. Even “Mr. Republi-
can,” Robert Taft, was an advocate of
federal housing assistance. Third, some
have argued that better housing implicit-
ly helps children by providing a healthier
and safer environment. Recent research
on Section 8 housing vouchers has found
that voucher recipients move to neigh-
borhoods with less crime and less expo-
sure to environmental irritants that may
trigger asthma.8
It is hard to justify mortgage-related
interventions with this line of reasoning
today. Essentially all Americans have ad-
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quintile of the population enjoys an av-
erage of 855 square feet of living space
per capita. Indeed, the average amount
of housing space consumed among the
poorest ½fth of Americans is nearly dou-
ble the population-wide average in
France, Germany, and the United King-
dom.9Americans are now, by either his-
toric or world standards, spectacularly
well housed. 
The third standard justi½cation for
mortgage-related interventions is that
they encourage homeownership and its
(alleged) attendant social bene½ts. Cer-
tainly, homeowners are more likely to
vote, go to church, garden, know the
name of their U.S. representatives, and
say that they “work to solve local prob-
lems.”10Economists have struggled to
identify whether these effects represent
a causal effect of homeownership, where-
by owning a house creates better citizens,
or whether the reverse is true: people
who are inclined to good citizenship are
more likely to become homeowners. 
One approach to this problem has
been to look at people over time, track-
ing whether their citizenship-related
activities change with homeownership
status. Using data on homeownership
and civic involvement in Germany,
economist Denise DiPasquale and I
have found that a change indeed occurs
when people become homeowners, but
the effect is much smaller than that esti-
mated by comparing homeowners and
renters.11We have also attempted other
–perhaps less convincing–means of es-
timating the causal link between owner-
ship and citizenship. For example, we
½nd that much of the impact of home-
ownership appears to come simply from
length of time lived in the community.
When people stay in one place, they de-
velop ties and work more for commu-
nal aims. 
The case for homeownership is also
supported by the view that it leads to as-
set accumulation. Certainly, homes are
the primary asset for many Americans,
and rising home values have made many
people wealthier. Various political lead-
ers, including former President George
W. Bush, have thought that America
would be better off if more people had
more capital and as a result have pro-
moted homeownership as a means of
achieving an “ownership society.” 
Economist David Albouy has provid-
ed a more original argument for the
home mortgage interest deduction.
Income taxes influence many person-
al decisions, such as how many hours 
to work or how much money to save;
economists typically consider these ar-
ti½cial influences, called distortions, to
be unfortunate.12Income taxes also dis-
tort decisions about where to live by dis-
proportionately taxing people who live
in highly productive, high-wage areas
like Boston and New York. Albouy ar-
gues that the home mortgage interest
deduction makes up for some of this 
distortion by providing greater bene-
½ts for people living in high-cost areas,
which tend to offer higher wages.13
T he real bene½ts of federal housing
policy must be stacked against the
costs. Perhaps the most obvious dis-
advantage of the home mortgage inter-
est deduction is its highly regressive
character. Economists James Poterba
and Todd Sinai have estimated that the
average homeowning household earn-
ing between $40,000 and $75,000 per
year receives an annual tax bene½t of
$523 from the deduction. An average
homeowning household that earns
more than $250,000 per year receives
a bene½t of $5,459.14These estimates
assume–no doubt incorrectly–that
behaviors would not change if the de-
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have no good way of estimating how
many people would pay off their mort-
gages were the deduction eliminated. 
Less attention has been paid to the
progressivity of subsidies implicit in 
the fha, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac.
The fha provides insurance only for 
less expensive homes and moderate-
income individuals, though in the past,
it has been accused of bias against mi-
norities and poorer neighborhoods.
Likewise, Fannie Mae’s and Freddie
Mac’s bene½ts typically go to a mid-
dle section of the U.S. income distribu-
tion. These programs certainly are not
strongly progressive–the very poor 
are less likely to be homeowners–but
they are also far less regressive than the
home mortgage interest deduction. 
The regressive nature of the deduction
should be part of any public discussion
about reform. To an economist, howev-
er, regressivity is not intrinsically damn-
ing. After all, the income tax as a whole
is highly progressive, and the regressivi-
ty of a particular deduction must be con-
sidered within that larger context. Even
more important, the tools of economics
do not naturally allow us to consider the
virtues of taking from one group of citi-
zens and giving to another. That discus-
sion is the province of philosophers and
politicians. 
More aptly, the tools of economics are
designed to judge the impact of these
mortgage subsidies on potential home-
owners’ behavior. The subsidies do more
than just encourage homeownership;
they have signi½cant, usually negative,
side effects–at least from the perspec-
tive of mainstream economics, which
generally views unjusti½ed distortions
of behavior as negative. 
Perhaps the most obvious distortion 
is that the subsidies encourage people to
invest excessively in housing relative to
other forms of capital. Indeed, providing
incentives for people to buy bigger homes
may not make much sense in a country
where homes are already extremely large.
Larger homes typically use more energy,15
and if carbon emissions damage the en-
vironment, then pushing people to buy
large, energy-intensive dwellings has
costs. 
By pushing homeownership as a source
of asset accumulation, the government
ensures that individual portfolios will be
highly skewed toward housing wealth.
As we have just seen, housing wealth is
hardly risk-free. Moreover, individual
wealth levels are often enormously sen-
sitive to changes in the housing market.
Private buyers and lenders ultimately
bear primary responsibility for the de-
faults and bankruptcies that have fol-
lowed the housing collapse, but by en-
couraging individuals to borrow to bet
on housing, the government bears some
auxiliary responsibility. 
Any housing subsidy would encour-
age individuals to invest too heavily 
in housing–relative to uninfluenced
decision-making–but mortgage subsi-
dies in particular encourage people to
leverage themselves to the hilt. Even
before the recent boom, in 1998, 3.9
percent of new mortgages had loan-to-
value ratios above 95 percent. Enabled 
by subsidized mortgage interest, indi-
viduals typically re½nance their homes
to get cash out. In turn, home buyers
have debt-½nanced portfolios, the value 
of which fluctuates wildly with the state
of the housing market. 
As Todd Sinai and Nick Souleles16
have argued, owning a home is itself
something of a hedge. People are born
into the world short of housing. Rent-
ers bear housing-price risk associated
with changes in rental costs. At its best,
homeownership provides protection
against these fluctuations in rental costs,
Dædalus  Fall 2010 101
Housing
policy in 
the wake 
of the 
crashbut for people who anticipate moving or
trading down, homeownership also cre-
ates portfolio risk. Policy that encour-
ages people to borrow as much as possi-
ble to invest in just one asset class is of
dubious value. 
Subsidizing homeownership and
housing consumption also impacts
urban form. There is a tight connec-
tion between structure type and owner-
ship type. More than 85 percent of peo-
ple who live in single-family detached
homes own their residences. More than
85 percent of people who live in struc-
tures with ½ve or more units rent. This
pattern provides good incentives for
maintaining single-family homes and
avoiding inter-owner conflict in multi-
family dwelling. Single-family detached
houses depreciate by an additional 1 per-
cent per year when they are occupied by
renters who fail to provide the sweat eq-
uity needed for maintenance. As those
familiar with co-op boards can attest,
the costs of spreading ownership of one
large structure across a large number of
owners underscore the bene½ts of hav-
ing one owner for each roof. 
But single-family detached houses are
typically in suburbs while apartments
are typically in cities. High land values 
in the urban core push structures up-
ward. Seventy-six percent of Manhattan
residents rent; 64 percent of residents in
nearby Westchester County own.17 By
subsidizing homeownership, the govern-
ment implicitly encourages people to
leave cities and move into single-family
detached houses elsewhere. 
There are good reasons to question
the many government policies, includ-
ing subsidies to agriculture and high-
way construction, which tilt against
urban areas. In many cases, suburbs 
are far more homogeneous than cities,
and encouraging suburbanization push-
es people to live in segregated polities.
Suburban living normally entails more
energy use because of larger homes and
longer commutes.18Much of the world’s
economic and cultural innovations oc-
cur in cities, and if such urban-centered
activity generates wider social bene½ts,
then discouraging city living carries fur-
ther social costs. 
Finally, homeowners are less mobile
and less able to respond to economic
shocks. Economist Andrew Oswald has
found that, across European regions,
unemployment is highest where home-
ownership is highest. This fact does not
hold in the United States, but his argu-
ment has merit, especially in declining
regions. Should public policy really be
encouraging poorer Americans to buy
property, tying them to cities that seem
locked in long-run decline? 
A housing market crash creates two
opposite pressures on government pol-
icy. On one side, it exposes the folly of
government policies that push people to
bet on housing markets. On the other, it
produces a dangerous climate in which
to attempt new policies that could de-
press the housing markets even more.
One force pushes toward reform, the
other toward the status quo. 
As of May 2010, the housing market
seemed somewhat less poised on the
brink of further disaster. Between May
2009 and January 2010, housing prices
remained relatively steady in much of
the country. In Las Vegas and Phoenix,
prices had returned to their historic
norms, which are closely related to con-
struction costs. If recent trends provide
any guide, the housing market can be
quite stable for many years after prices
level off. For example, between March
1991 and May 1997, the Case/Shiller ten-
city index neither rose nor fell more than
2.5 percent in nominal terms relative to
its March 1991 level. It is therefore rea-
102 Dædalus  Fall 2010
Edward L.
Glaeser 
on the
½nancial
crisis &
economic
policysonable to contemplate appropriate
housing reforms as long as those re-
forms are implemented gradually and
with care. 
The most promising target is the home
mortgage interest deduction. Even if the
goal of homeownership is considered
sacrosanct, there are far better ways to
promote it. The deduction not only has 
a number of harmful side effects, like
encouraging borrowing and extra hous-
ing consumption, but it is also poorly
targeted. The biggest bene½ts of the de-
duction accrue to the wealthy, who are
likely to be homeowners regardless of
tax policy. Less prosperous Americans,
who are as equally likely to own a home
as they are to rent, often fail to itemize
the deduction even if they are home-
owners. In fact, more than three-quar-
ters of homeowners do not itemize; the
poorest four-tenths of Americans take
the standard deduction.19
For this group, the mortgage interest
deduction does little, if anything. Over
time, the deduction greatly increases in
value during expected periods of high in-
flation because nominal interest can be
deducted, yet there is hardly an observ-
able increase in homeownership during
periods when the deduction becomes
more valuable. Across states, the size of
the bene½t (or changes in the size of the
bene½t) has no apparent effect on home-
ownership. 
To increase homeownership without
encouraging excessive borrowing or big-
ger homes, the natural tool would be a
flat homeowner’s tax credit. This tax
credit could be independent of the size
of the house or mortgage, would reduce
tax payments for every American who
owns his or her own home, and could
be included on top of the standard de-
duction. This clear, tangible tax bene½t
would accrue to the owner regardless of
the size or value of the home, and would
thus be far less tilted toward the rich.
Inevitably, homeowners will tend to 
be wealthier, and a tax credit likely will
not bene½t people who do not pay taxes.
Nevertheless, even though a flat home-
owner’s tax credit would still encourage
migration from cities and would still
give more bene½ts to the rich, it would
be far less regressive and distortionary
than the current policy. 
As a somewhat more politically fea-
sible policy approach, the cap on the
home mortgage interest deduction
might be lowered from $1 million to, 
say, $300,000, as suggested by the 2005
Tax Reform Panel. A simple, gradual
method of implementing this change
would be to reduce the deduction cap 
by $100,000 per year for the next seven
years. To a small degree, the cap would
limit the incentive to invest in larger
homes or borrow extreme amounts, 
but this approach would be decidedly
second-best relative to the straight tax
credit; for most Americans, it would
preserve strong incentives to borrow
and buy large homes. 
The fha, Fannie Mae, and Freddie
Mac present a thornier problem. It is
reasonable to argue that the fhadoes
solve a genuine market failure. More-
over, it provides for lower income 
Americans and is thus the least attrac-
tive candidate for major reform. The
fha has taken on a great deal of risk, 
but by slightly raising fees, it can easily
accumulate enough capital to continue 
to cover its costs. 
The case for a major overhaul of 
Freddie and Fannie is considerably
stronger. At the time of this writing,
many estimates for the taxpayer losses
paid by Fannie and Freddie were up-
wards of $300 billion.20Any subsidy 
to homeownership can be created di-
rectly through the tax system; there 
is little apparent need for a second,
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crashless visible subsidy operating through
government-sponsored enterprises. 
These public agencies may not need 
to exist at all, but if they do, they will
probably function best as slow-moving,
highly regulated public utilities, with a
mandate limited to insuring, bundling,
and selling mortgage-backed securities.
One model suggests reinstating them
as a strong, independent public entity,
with a governance structure vaguely re-
sembling that of the Federal Reserve
Board. The gses have often been thought
to wield much weight on Capitol Hill,
and lawmakers have often supported
an expansion of their activities, as long 
as this expansion was joined with other
activities that lawmakers found desir-
able. A better model would establish a
national mortgage insurer with a great-
er degree of separation from politics 
and the pro½t motive. 
National mortgage insurers should 
be required to refrain from all activities
other than the insuring, bundling, and
selling of mortgages. There is no reason
for these entities to hold hundreds of
billions of dollars of mortgage-backed
securities in their own portfolios, as 
they did before the crash. If the agency
is meant to solve market failures that
challenge a purely private secondary
mortgage market, then it should stick 
to that function. 
A revamped public mortgage insurer
would continue to charge a guarantee
fee based on borrowers’ loan-to-value
and credit score. However, fees can be
conservatively high. Moreover, the na-
tional mortgage insurer, like the Feder-
al Reserve Board, should recognize that
housing prices are not like stocks. They
do not typically follow a random walk
but, rather, show considerable mean re-
version over ½ve-year horizons. To cor-
rect this phenomenon, guarantee fees
should be based not only on the ratio
of loan-to-purchase price, but also on
the ratio of loan-to-expected resale val-
ue, which may be considerably lower. 
For example, in markets that have ris-
en considerably, expected resale value
will be lower than current prices because
prices tend to revert to historic norms.
In markets where there is little restraint
on building and land is abundant (which
is the case in much of America), expect-
ed resale value should be tied to con-
struction costs–despite the vicissitudes
of current prices–with the expectation
that prices will eventually return to the
costs of delivering housing. While it is
a mistake to put too much faith in any
forecasting model, the evidence for mean
reversion is suf½ciently strong that re-
quiring higher guarantee fees in places
that have experienced signi½cant recent
price increases is a solid policy approach.
If this policy had been followed during
the boom, then guarantee fees would
have become much higher during the
booms of Phoenix and Las Vegas. The
higher fees would have both protected
the gses against risk and perhaps also
helped check the wild swings in prices. 
It is, of course, quite possible that an
excessively conservative national mort-
gage insurer will charge too much, but
that is a fairly minor problem as long as
there are no barriers to free entry in the
market for mortgage insurance. If pri-
vate insurers offer better and cheaper
products, then the public entity will not
have much business, which is perfectly
acceptable, at least as long as the private
insurers cannot offer an implicit govern-
ment guarantee of their own. The nation-
al mortgage insurer should guarantee
that the secondary mortgage market
does not disappear; that is its primary
function. 
T he great national housing convulsion
bears two major lessons: housing mat-
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nary home buyers and the global ½nan-
cial system can suffer enormously when
housing markets crash. It is neither pos-
sible nor desirable to legislate housing
bubbles out of existence; the human
capacity for over-optimism is just too
strong. But it is both possible and desir-
able to limit the public role in encourag-
ing those bubbles and to reduce the suf-
fering they cause. We can reduce the
public subsidies that encourage people 
to borrow as much as possible to make
risky investments in housing. 
The tax code is currently geared to
induce mortgage debt. Every buyer 
who bought during the boom had the
blessing of a government that encour-
aged homebuying through rhetoric 
and the tax code. Additional subsidies
were provided by the government-
sponsored enterprises, which insured
mortgages at a cost that now seems
too low. These policies arti½cially en-
couraged borrowing. 
Even if America wants to encourage
homeownership, it does not need to en-
courage borrowing or buying big homes.
A simple, moderate homeowner’s tax
credit would encourage homeownership
more fairly and with fewer distortions.
A plodding, conservative public mort-
gage insurer that charges relatively high
fees can ensure the existence of a sec-
ondary mortgage market with less risk
to taxpayers and less excessive borrow-
ing. The housing crash exposed the folly
of subsidizing leveraged bets on hous-
ing. It would be a shame if we ignore
that lesson.
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